Goal Analysis versus Institutional Analysis of Toxic Compensation Systems by Elliott, E. Donald




How to compensate individuals for exposure to toxic substances has been
hotly debated in legal circles recently.' Most of the debate has been based on an
assumption that is usually taken for granted: that reform must be accomplished
by tinkering with the legal doctrines courts apply in toxic tort cases.2
The immediate purpose of this article is to question that assumption. Its the-
sis is that many of the problems that now afflict toxic compensation law cannot
be solved as long as the issue is formulated in terms of modifying the legal doc-
trines applied by courts in toxic tort cases. Rather than debating about how to
modify traditional tort law doctrines to accommodate toxic tort cases, we should
be focusing on the problems of toxics in the environment from the standpoint of
the legal system as a whole. From this perspective, the correct way to formulate
the inquiry is in terms of two separate but related questions: (1) what role com-
pensation through the legal system should play in an overall social strategy for
dealing with toxic substances in the environment; and (2) which of a variety of
institutions available to the legal system is best suited to dealing with toxic com-
pensation problems.
Although the immediate focus in what follows is on problems of toxic com-
pensation law, the analytic approach outlined here has broader ramifications. A
central premise for the analysis is that much of contemporary thinking in the law
schools is still the prisoner of outdated habits of thought inherited from the com-
mon law. These habitual modes of analysis, which may be termed "Goal Analy-
sis," have served well in a number of areas of law, such as torts, contracts,
constitutional law, and antitrust. In these fields, courts arguably function as the
dominant lawmaking institutions. Today, however, fewer and fewer areas of law
are characterized by a structure in which courts act on their own to make law in
relative isolation. Even where courts are still a significant factor in the total
lawmaking process, their role has changed as the result of the rise of a variety of
Professor of Law, Yale Law School
1. Eg., SUPERFUND SECTION 301(E) STUDY GROUP, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., INJURIES AND DAMAGES
FROM HAZARDOUS WASTES-ANALYSIs AND IMPROVEMENT OF LEGAL REMEDIES; A REPORT TO
CONGRESS IN COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 301(E) OF THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RE-
SPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND LIABILITY ACT OF 1980 (Comm. Print 1982); Black & Lilienfeld, Epide-
miologic Proof in Toxic Tort Litigation, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 732 (1984); Robinson, Probabilistic
Causation and Compensation for Tortious Risk, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. (1985) (forthcoming); Rosenberg, The
Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARv. L. REv.
849 (1984).
2. Robinson, supra note 1; see also Black & Lilienfeld, supra note 1, at 733-34 (many reforms in toxic
tort litigation would require institutional innovation).
For a refreshing departure from the usual assumption that courts must be the central institutions in-
volved in toxic compensation law, see Huber, The Ahopalization of U.S. Tort Law, ISSUES IN SCIENCE
AND TECHNOLOGY, Fall, 1985, at 73. See also Huber, Safety and the Second Bes= The Hazards of Public
Risk Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277 (1985).
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other active lawmaking institutions.3
The traditional techniques of Goal Analysis are fundamentally inadequate to
cope with the modem reality in which a broad variety of lawmaking institutions
created by statute are available to the legal system, and in which the predomi-
nant lawmaking structure combines courts, administrative agencies, and legisla-
tures into a composite lawmaking system. If legal scholarship is to continue to
make a significant contribution to efforts to reform the law, we must develop
techniques and modes of analysis that will allow us to do more than simply
analyze the effects of modifications in the legal doctrines applied by courts. The
alternative approach proposed in this article, which is called "Institutional'Anal-
ysis," is an attempt to take a first step in the direction of analyzing a policy
problem from the standpoint of the modem legal system as a whole. 4
If it were up to me to design a regime to regulate risks from toxic substances in
the environment and to compensate people for injuries as the result of exposures,
here is what I would do:
(1) Criminal prosecution would be the principal instrument for deter-
ring corporations from exposing people to unreasonable risks of serious
bodily harm due to risks that were known or knowable at the time the
exposure occurred. Substances known to cause harm could be placed
on a list through an administrative process as evidence accumulates, in
much the same way that the Attorney General is now authorized to
add substances to the list of "controlled substances" whose abuse is
punishable by law. 5
One of the principal distortions in current tort law is that civil jury verdicts
are being used not simply to compensate victims who have been injured by the
wrongful act of another, but also as a substitute for regulations and the criminal
law. 6 If responsible officers of a corporation really have intentionally exposed
3.
The growth of a vast administrative bureaucracy with lawmaking powers is not a mere additive
change to the structure of government. Inevitably it has transformed the nature and functions of
existing institutions as well.. . . No longer are the courts the primary expositors of the law as
they were in the nineteenth century. Instead, they review law made by others. Federal courts
have become part of a composite lawmaking system, in which they function in conjunction with
legislatures and administrative decisionmakers so that the law is the joint product of all three.
Elliott, INS v. Chadha: The Administrative Constitution, The Constitution, And The Legislative Veto, 1983
Sup. Cr. REv. 125, 167. But cf Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1
(1983).
4. For an example of work in another area that uses an approach somewhat similar to that identified
here as Institutional Analysis, see Bush, Dispute Resolution Alternatives and the Goals of Civil Justice:
Jurisdictional Principles for Process Choice, 1984 Wisc. L. REv. 893.
5. 21 U.S.C. § 811(a) (1982).
6. A classic statement of the (in my view, misguided) position that case-by-case tort litigation, rather
than regulation and the criminal law, is the best way to ban deadly products is Brodeur, Annals of Law:
The Asbestos Industry on Trial (pt. IV Bankruptcy), THE NEw YORKER, Jul. 1, 1985, at 36, 78-80. Bro-
deur overlooks the effect of adminstratively established regulations in reducing the use of asbestos. More
fundamentally, however, he is a prisoner of the status quo (and of the plaintiffs' trial lawyers that he
interviewed) in that he confuses what did happen with what should have happened. Even assuming that
Brodeur is correct historically that tort litigation eventually produced a "triumph of justice," id. at 78,
because civil verdicts eventually became too expensive for asbestos manufacturers, resulting in a virtual
ban on the use of asbestos, Brodeur overlooks the fact that according to his own account it took the tort
system 50 years to accomplish the ban after the scientific evidence appeared. See generally id. (pt. I, A
Failure to Warn), THE NEW YORKER, June 10, 1985, at 49. Moreover, for the first 40 years, most claim-
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other human beings to an unreasonable risk of death, prosecuting them for mur-
der-not punitive damages against the corporation in a tort case-is the appro-
priate legal remedy to express the community's sense of moral outrage and to
deter similar misconduct in the future. 7 On the other hand, it should be an abso-
lute defense that the defendant complied with applicable regulatory standards.
When responsible regulatory officials have struck a balance between safety and
other competing considerations, after a full review of the relevant scientific infor-
mation,8 a lay jury should not be able to strike a different balance between com-
peting social values in an individual case after the fact.9
(2) Regulation, in the form of minimum health and safety standards
set by administrative agencies, would be used to limit risks to socially
acceptable levels. Standards would be precautionary, aimed at keeping
risks as low as reasonably achievable,10 based on a balancing of the
strength of the scientific evidence that a substance may cause harm, the
seriousness of the potential harm involved, and the cost of compliance.
In appropriate cases, economic incentives (marketable permits, regula-
tory taxes) might be used in lieu of "command and control" regulation
to implement standards, but the level of risk that is socially acceptable
should be determined through an administrative process. 1
(3) A compensation fund would reimburse claimants for out-of-pocket
medical expenses and losses of earnings. Individuals would be eligible
if they suffered greater than de minimis injuries of a type that some
credible scientific evidence suggests may be causally related to expo-
sures to a chemical substance, but for which evidence does not permit
matching of particular illnesses to particular exposures.
The compensation fund could be administered either by government or
ants seeking compensation through the tort system left the courtroom empty-handed. See generally id.
(pt. 11I, Judgment), THE NEW YORKER, June 24, 1985, at 45.
7. See N.Y. Times, Jul. 2, 1985, at All, cols. 5-7 (describing sentencing of executives of film recovery
company that used cyanide without adequate precautions, resulting in death of worker); Brodeur (pt. IV
Bankruptcy), supra note 6, at 78.
8. It might be objected that if regulatory standards had preclusive effect, polluters would have in-
creased incentives to withhold information from regulators on the true extent of risks. That problem can
be dealt with directly, however, by creating an affirmative obligation to report new information suggesting
that a substance may be harmful (or more harmful than previously thought). See Toxic Substances Con-
trol Act § 8(e), 15 U.S.C. § 2607(e) (1982) (manufacturers, processors, and distributors of chemical sub-
stances or mixtures who obtain information that such substances or mixtures present substantial risk of
injury to health or environment shall immediately report this); see also Atkeson, Toxics Regulation and
Products Liability: Decreasing Exposure in the Workplace, Increasing Exposure in the Courts, 13 ENvTL.
L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INsr.) 10,418 (1983) (reviewing regulatory requirements that industry generate and
report information on possible hazards of substances).
9. Because they are lay decision makers who decide individual cases after the fact and are not required
to state reasons for their decisions, civil juries are inherently ill-suited to develop comprehensive regula-
tory policies. See G. CALABRESI & P. BOBBrrr, TRAGIC CHOICES 57 (1976) (describing characteristics of
civil juries).
10. Cf 10 C.F.R. § 20.1(c) (1985) (exposures to radiation from NRC-licensed activities should be kept
"as low as is reasonably achievable taking into account the state of technology, and the economics of
improvements in relation to benefits to the public health and safety, and other societal and socioeconomic
considerations, and in relation to the utilization of atomic energy in the public interest.").
11. See Mashaw, Pro-Delegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, I YALE J.L.,
ECON. & ORG. 81 (1985); see also B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSLER, CLEAN CoAL/DIRTY AIR 116-28
(1981) (proposing that Congress set ultimate goals but leave to agencies the task of devising particular
strategies to achieve the objectives).
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private bodies.12 Contributions would be assessed administratively,
based on an estimate of the percentage of the total costs of a malady
attributable to exposure to a particular substance. The cost that cannot
reasonably be attributed to any substance-probably a large propor-
tionl-would have to be distributed externally as a cost to be borne by
a broader community.14
(4) Tort cases would be available-if at all-only if the plaintiff could
prove, based on the evidence available at the time of trial, that it was
more probable than not that particular injuries were caused by expo-
sure to particular substances. In addition to medical expenses and loss
of earnings, the successful tort plaintiff could recover additional ele-
ments of damages, such as decreases in property values and pain and
suffering. However, compliance with an administrative standard
would be an absolute defense to a tort action.
Punitive damages could be available only if the plaintiff proved both
that the defendant acted with reckless disregard of information avail-
able at the time of exposure and that government had defaulted in its
duty to regulate and prosecute criminally.
These suggestions are not particularly innovative; in many respects, they ap-
proximate existing laws, or reforms that have already been proposed in the liter-
ature. Nor am I totally confident that my proposals draw the lines between
remedies in the right places; others might reasonably conclude that I have put
too much faith in criminal sanctions and the administrative process, 15 while giv-
ing too little credit to civil actions before common law courts.
What I do think is significant about the approach I have suggested, however,
12. One method of administering a compensation fund privately is insurance. See generally Abraham,
Cost Internalization, Insurance and Toxic Tort Compensation Funds, 2 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 123
(1982). Another interesting approach involves submitting claims directly to entities that may be responsi-
ble, who would pay them and then seek adjustments from other potentially responsible parties. Cf
O'Connell, Foreclosing Claimsfor Personal Injury from Toxic Substances by Defendants' Tender of Claim-
ants'Net Economic Losses, 2 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L 203 (1982). This general approach has recently
been discussed as a possible element in federal product liability legislation. Title II, Staff Working Draft,
A Bill to Regulation Interstate Commerce by Providing for a Uniform Product Liability Law, and for
Other Purposes (July 15, 1985) (unpublished draft of a bill on file with the Georgetown Law Journal). One
advantage of a system that relies on direct processing of claims by private parties is that it may have lower
administrative costs for some categories of cases than case-by-case litigation through the judicial system.
13. See L. Cox & J. FIKSEL, A CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE PROBABILITY OF CAUSATION METHOD 28-
33 (Arthur D. Little Report No. 50,041) (1984) (describing difficulties in attributing risk shares to chemi-
cal carcinogens).
14. The most obvious way to distribute costs more broadly is through a general tax, but that technique
may not be politically acceptable. Other approaches are available, however, which have much the same
effect. For example, if the known contributors to the risk are made liable for the entire cost (including
that which they did not cause), they will bear a portion of the costs directly, and pass a portion of these
increased costs along to their customers in the form of higher prices. Economically, the effect is the same
as a tax, which falls in part on the known contributors to the risk and in part on their customers.
15. Perhaps the weightiest objection to enhanced reliance on regulation and the criminal law is that
government officials may be susceptible to political influence and may regulate too leniently or inappropri-
ately decline to bring criminal cases. Admittedly, these problems exist, but they also exist in many other
areas of law and are not generally thought to require the preservation of a general right to sue for civil
damages. If private initiation of legal action is deemed essential, however, it would be better to use the
courts to force the government to act, see generally Stewart & Sunstein, Public Programs and Private
Rights, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1195 (1982), rather than undermine its actions by enunciating a different
standard through tort cases.
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is that it is offered as a package in which all the major techniques the legal
system uses to regulate chemicals in the environment are applied in a systematic,
coordinated way to deal with various kinds of toxics problems. The coordinating
principle behind this division of responsibility is the availability of scientific
knowledge about the causal relationship between exposures and disease or other
maladies, as I will explain in more detail at the end of the article. For the mo-
ment, however, the important thing is not the particular principle, but rather
that there is a coordinating principle-that a self-conscious attempt has been
made to organize the various techniques the law brings to bear on toxics
problems.
Much of the prevailing confusion about how the legal system should handle
toxics results from inappropriate applications of legal mechanisms to situations
for which they are ill-suited. Because we have failed to develop ways to select,
coordinate, and limit the domains of various legal remedies, we are trying to
accomplish all of our social goals simultaneously through regulation, litigation,
compensation, and prosecution. We end up with a legal mishmash that cannot
do anything very well.
One symptom of this problem is the judicial confusion about the purposes of
products liability law. Judges can no longer figure out the nature of the enter-
prise. Are they there to compensate victims regardless of fault? To regulate the
safety of products? To punish morally culpable manufacturers? To internalize
social costs in the interest of economic efficiency? I believe that the root of the
mess is the balkanization of law into arbitrary "fields." As a result, tort lawyers
know little about criminal law; criminal lawyers know little about tort law;
neither knows anything about taxes or insurance; and nobody really tries to un-
derstand the nature of the scientific information that underlies the problems.
The single most important thing that we could do to improve the way that the
legal system deals with toxic substances is to coordinate various "fields," so that
appropriate legal techniques can be matched to the structure of particular toxics
problems. 16 The mode of analysis I am proposing, in which legal institutions and
techniques are "matched" to the structure of particular problems, contrasts
sharply with the conventional approach used by lawyers to analyze problems of
tort law in general and the reform of "toxic torts" in particular. The usual ap-
proach takes as given a single field of law with its attendant institutions-for
example, products liability cases before judges and juries. One then asks how the
rules in that field of law might be modified to reflect the balance among society's
goals. Essentially ignored by conventional Goal Analysis are other mechanisms
available to the legal system for accomplishing similar objectives. In addition,
the conventional approach forces the would-be reformer to confront extremely
difficult (perhaps intractable) issues of social policy, as one is asked to determine
how to trade-off deterrence against administrative costs, victim compensation
against economic efficency, and so on.
In what follows, I will first illustrate how conventional legal Goal Analysis
deals with problems of causation in tort law. I also suggest why if we proceed in
the conventional manner, we cannot hope to get very far in reforming the legal
16. Cf S. Breyer, REGULATION AND ITs REFORM 191-284 (1982) (analyzing "mismatches" of regula-
tory techniques to particular problems).
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system to deal with toxic substances in the environment. In the second section, I
outline a different approach, adapted from Stephen Breyer's theory of regulatory
"mismatches." 17 1 call this alternative approach "Institutional Analysis." In the
final section, I apply Institutional Analysis to justify the package approach to
toxics I proposed at the beginning of the article.
The Institutional Analysis approach to toxic law reform that I am suggesting
differs from Goal Analysis in two principal ways. First, the institutional analyst
takes the legal system as a whole as the relevant domain for analysis, not a nar-
row, arbitrary field such as produ-t liability law or the design of regulatory taxes
under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liabil-
ity Act of 1980 ("Superfund").18 Second, the institutional analyst does not as-
sume that legal doctrine is infinitely plastic, and then ask how to redesign it to
accommodate competing social goals; rather, she assumes that most legal doc-
trines are relatively inelastic because they are limited by the information-process-
ing capabilities of the institutions that apply them. Therefore, the range of
results that can be achieved by modifying doctrine alone is relatively narrow. As
a consequence, the primary concern of the institutional analyst is "matching"
legal techniques and institutions to problems by asking, for example, whether the
problem of cigarette smoking is more appropriately attacked by a warning label,
a regulatory tax, or a series of verdicts by common law juries. In short, while the
goal analyst focuses exclusively on the doctrinal "software" applied by one part
of the legal system, the institutional analyst is concerned with the choice of insti-
tutional "hardware." While the goal analyst asks how to modify the legal doc-
trines applied by courts to reflect a balance among society's goals, the
institutional analyst regards the legal system as a package of a dozen or so rela-
tively fixed techniques that might be applied to a problem, and asks which of
them seems most likely to work well for that particular problem.
This mode of analysis adapts to legal analysis Nobel Prize-winning economist
Herbert Simon's insight that human beings and their institutions have only lim-
ited capability to perform elaborate optimizing calculations; therefore, we must
make decisions by applying a few standardized routines or "standard operating
procedures" and determining whether the results are satisfactory. 19 Before the
goal analyst can tell us how to modify legal doctrine, she needs a comprehensive
specification of the optimal tradeoffs among competing social goals. But this is
precisely the kind of elaborate, optimizing calculation that, according to Simon,
human beings cannot perform. Institutional Analysis, on the other hand, at-
tempts to reformulate the questions relevant to legal reform so that they come
closer to the kinds of questions that human beings can actually answer. Rather
than requiring a comprehensive specification of the optimal tradeoffs among so-
cial goals, the institutional analyst assumes only that there is a rough working
consensus on what we want from the legal system, which is sufficient to permit
17. Id. Stephen Breyer now serves on the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982).
19. See generally H. SIMON, ADMINTRATIVE BEHAVIOR: A STuDY OF DECISION-MAKING
PROCESSES IN ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATIONS (3d ed. 1976); see also Latin, Problem-Solving Behavior
and Theories of Tort Liability, 73 CALIF. L REV. 677, 693-95 (1985) (applying Simon's theories to suggest
modifications of tort law doctrines). Latin uses Simon's work to inform traditional Goal Analysis, while I
believe its implications are more fundamental.
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us to distinguish satisfactory institutional arrangements from unsatisfactory
ones:
(1) We want risks from toxics in the environment to be kept as low as
is reasonably achievable, given the limitations of scientific knowledge
and economic resources.
(2) We want to compensate those who suffer catastrophic losses, in
spite of our best efforts to protect them, by spreading the costs of the
loss.
(3) We want to punish those who have behaved in a morally reprehen-
sible fashion by risking the lives of others for their own private
purposes.
We may differ as to how the balance should be struck in particular cases and
we certainly would find it difficult to specify the optimum balance among goals
in the abstract (what economists call constructing the social "objective func-
tion"). But there is enough of a working consensus to let us distinguish satisfac-
tory "matches" of legal institutions to problems from unsatifactory
"mismatches." The task of reform will be far easier if we reformulate the inquiry
to ask not how to modify the doctrines of tort law to accommodate toxics cases,
but which of the available legal techniques would stand the best chance of
achieving our shared goals, considering the nature of toxics problems.
II. CONVENTIONAL GOAL ANALYSIS AND CAUSATION
The Goal Analysis approach to tort law that I am opposing goes back at least
to the writing of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. in the late nineteenth century.
Holmes argued that in a "doubtful case," with plausible legal arguments on
either side, judges must have social ends "articulately in their minds."'20
In our own day, the leading school of Goal Analysis has been the "law and
economics" movement. Two alternative moves are available to Goal Analysis
for dealing with the fact that many different social goals underlie law. The two
moves are illustrated by the work of the two leading tort scholars of the law and
economics persuasion during our time, Richard Posner and Guido Calabresi. In
my opinion, neither successfully resolves the problem of how to trade-off com-
peting social goals.
Posner dissolves the problem of balancing competing social goals by assuming
that a common metric exists--"efficiency" or "wealth," measured in dollars. It
follows from this assumption that tort law (and indeed, every other aspect of the
law) has only a single goal: to maximize wealth.21 In many areas, antitrust law,
for example, these assumptions work tolerably well, and law and economics is a
powerful tool for the policy analyst or would-be reformer. In toxics law, how-
ever, where one inevitably faces conflicts between life and health on the one
hand, and economic costs on the other, law and economics is less acceptable as a
20. Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARv. L. REv. 443, 460 (1899). For a discussion
of the "instrumentalism" in Holmes' approach to law, see Gordon, Holmes' Common Law as Legal and
Social Science, 10 HOFSTRA L. REv. 719 (1982).
21. See generally Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adju-
dication, 8 HoFsrRA L. REv. 487 (1980) (arguing that "wealth maximization" is an ethically attractive
norm in common law adjudication).
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method of analysis-and is, therefore, less useful to the would-be reformer.22
At least two standard objections to Posner's position inhibit its usefulness in
the toxics area. First, many people do not share-indeed, they find abhorrent-
the assumption that dollars are an adequate way to measure, say, the suffering of
a worker who will die a slow, painful death from asbestosis. 23 A second argu-
ment against the Posnerian approach is that terms like "wealth" and "efficiency"
are simply names for the aggregation of individuals' goals, and that using them
obscures rather than illuminates their content. 24
Calabresi's approach, on the other hand, avoids the problem of assuming that
all values are fungible and can be measured in a common unit, by identifying
competing goals but making no attempt to suggest how they should be traded-off
against one another.2 5 Again, this approach is highly useful for some purposes,
such as provoking students to think critically about the interests underlying
traditional tort law, but Calabresi's mode of analysis is also only marginally
helpful to the would-be reformer of toxic compensation law.
Consider, for example, Calabresi's classic analysis of causation doctrine in tort
law in his famous article, For Harry Kalven.26 Traditional doctrines of causation
in tort law require a plaintiff to prove that the defendant's conduct was more
probably than not both the "but-for cause in fact" and the "proximate cause" of
the plaintiff's injuries. 27 Many lawyers who write about toxic torts from the con-
ventional Goal Analysis perspective conclude that causation doctrine is one of
the key elements that would have to be modified in order to adapt traditional
tort law to facilitate recovery in toxic tort cases. 28 In my opinion, however, Cala-
bresi's brilliant exegesis of the role of causation doctrine in traditional tort law is
of little or no help to the would-be reformer in deciding how to redesign the
system. While Calabresi identifies a mix of goals that can be thought of as un-
derlying the doctrines of existing tort law, he offers no guidance about how to
balance the goals or to modify the system.
Calabresi begins his article by identifying the approach to legal analysis that I
have been calling "Goal Analysis" as the "functional approach [that] has come
to dominate American tort scholarship. '29 As a self-proclaimed functional ana-
lyst, Calabresi's project is to consider "the role causation [doctrine] should play
when tort law is examined in terms of deterrence, spreading, and distributional
goals."' 30 He distinguishes between three different concepts of causation, which
22. See S. KELMAN, WHAT PRICE INCENTIVES? (1981) (critique of economists who propose use of
economic incentives rather than pollution standards in environmental policy).
23. IdL at 47-48; see also Doniger, Federal Regulation of Vinyl Chloride, 7 EcOL. L.Q. 497, 521 (1978)
('That some must die so that all can eat is one thing; that some must die so that all can have see-through
food packaging is another.").
24. See Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REv. 451, 477-82
(1974).
25. See Calabresi, About Law and Economics: A Letter to Ronald Dworkin, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 553,
557-59 (1980).
26. Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. CHI. L.
REv. 69 (1975).
27. See W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41 (5th ed. 1984).
28. Eg., Ginsburg & Weiss, Common Law Liability for Toxic Torts A Phantom Remedy, 9 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 859, 922-23 (1981).
29. Calabresi, supra note 26, at 70.
30. Id
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he calls "causal link," "but for cause," and "proximate cause."'31 By a "causal
link," Calabresi means something similar to what a scientist might mean by a
weak causal association: "the recurrence of [an] act or activity will increase the
chances that the injury will also occur."'32 "But for cause," on the other hand, is
the law's traditional requirement-reputed to cause much trouble in toxics
cases33-that to be the legal cause of an injury, an act must be among the "acts
or activities without which a particular injury would not have occurred."' 34 Fi-
nally, Calabresi defines "proximate cause" in the conclusory sense of that set of
causally linked, and "usually (but by no means always) but for causes" to which
"a particular legal system wishes to assign at least partial responsibility for an
accident." '35
Calabresi then analyzes causal link, but for cause, and proximate cause in rela-
tion to what he takes to be the four instrumental goals of tort law: "two 'com-
pensation goals,' specific or collective deterrence, and two 'deterrence goals,'
general and market deterrence."' 36 In each instance, he concludes that no single
goal of tort law is sufficient to explain the prevailing legal concepts; rather, tort
law "is a system that responds to mixed goals." 37
For example, Calabresi points out that "[i]f spreading of injury losses were the
only goal of tort law, there would be no point at all in requiring, as a prerequisite
to liability, a causal link between an act or activity and the injury."' 38 "If spread-
ing were the only goal of tort law, a social insurance fund, raised through taxes
on a per capita basis, would be the optimal mechanism for achieving it. ' '39 Simi-
larly, Calabresi argues that "[i]f market deterrence were the only goal of tort
law, then all causation problems would be reduced to a search for the cheapest
cost avoider," 4 the person (not necessarily a party to the case) who can for the
least expense either prevent the accident or bear the costs of it. Here again,
however, Calabresi concludes that tort law has not grown in response to any
single goal, but instead represents an amalgam or compromise among multiple
social goals that may pull in different directions.
However, where multiple goals such as deterrence, compensation, and punish-
ment of reprehensible conduct are involved, the legal system will usually accom-
plish all of them in a more satisfactory way if it differentiates separate
institutions (e.g., regulation, insurance, criminal law) to perform separate func-
tions. Each institution can then be tailored with a particular goal in mind, as
opposed to trying to accomplish all of the law's goals at once through a single
institution. Calabresi himself recognizes that sometimes there are dangers in try-
ing to pursue multiple goals through a single body of law.4 1
31. Id. at 71.
32. Id.
33. See Ginsburg & Weiss, supra note 28, at 923-24.
34. Calabresi, supra note 26, at 72.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 73. For an elaboration of these goals, see G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970).
37. Calabresi, supra note 26, at 100-01.
38. Id. at 73.
39. Id. at 74.
40. Id. at 100.
41. See id. at 101-02 ("I do not think it is desirable to mix collective and market deterrence goals in one
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There is another reason why this kind of Goal Analysis is unavailing as a tool
for reformers. Implicit in the work of goal analysts like Holmes and Calabresi is
the assumption that all the goals society wants to pursue are to be achieved
through the common law. To put the point another way, the common law
method presumes that the common law is the only game in town. The classic
image of the process of common law lawmaking is that judges determine the just
result in a series of individual cases and gradually abstract principles from the
pattern of results that have been reached.42 But the notion that judges can use
their common sense to derive general principles of law depends on there being no
other lawmaking institutions operating simultaneously in related areas. To take
a concrete example, suppose that the traditional rules of causation in tort law
were built up reflecting judges' sense of the appropriate balance between com-
pensation goals and deterrence goals. But suppose in the meantime another in-
stitution, such as government safety regulation or employer-supplied medical
insurance, develops and serves to perform part of the function that was per-
formed by tort law at its inception. Is there any reason to be confident that the
common sense of judges will change to reflect the new social reality? Or will
they simply continue to focus on the equities of the individual cases before them,
in splendid isolation?4 3
III. INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
The institutional analyst approaches toxics problems from a different direc-
tion. Rather than taking certain legal institutions (namely, courts) for granted
and concentrating attention on goals and doctrine, the institutional analyst
reverses the process: social goals and legal doctrines are taken more or less for
granted while attention is concentrated on the structure of the particular prob-
lem and on selecting legal mechanisms and institutions appropriate to it.
At the outset, the institutional analyst faces an apparent paradox. How is one
to know which features of problems are significant unless one already has some
sense of the strengths and weaknesses of available institutions? At the same
time, however, how is one to know which features of institutions are important
unless one already has some sense of the nature of the problem? This difficulty is
easier to resolve in practice than it is in concept. The institutional analyst must
system. Results like The Wagon Mound which hamper market deterrence, but do not go far enough to
achieve adequate collective deterrence, seem all too likely.") (footnotes omitted).
Calabresi's preference for a system like the tort system, which responds to mixed goals, appears to be
based principally on his belief that in areas where "tragic choices" must be made that adversely affect the
lives and well-being of some citizens, government should not make clear to the public the basis for its
actions. Id. at 100 n.48; see generally G. CALABRESI & P. Boaarrr, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978).
42. See, eg., E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1949).
43. Granted, tort law does recognize a number of technical rules that allow judges to consider the
existence of other institutions, such as insurance or government safety regulation. In general, however, the
substance of these rules denies that the existence of the parallel institution in any way alters the inquiry
the common law court is to follow. Thus, the "collateral source rule" holds that the plaintiff's compensa-
tion for his medical expenses by insurance in no way affects his right to recover tort damages, which are,
by hypothesis, predicated in part on a compensation goal. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 920A(2) (1979). Similarly, the existence of government safety regulations normally does not preclude a
jury from holding liable an injurer who had complied fully with the measures determined by the "expert"
agency to strike the optimal social balance between risk and the cost of precautions. See Silkwood v.
Kerr-McGee Corp., 104 S. Ct. 615, 626 (1984) (state-authorized punitive damages assessed against nu-
clear power facility did not conflict with federal nuclear regulations).
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proceed repetitiously, by successive approximations, looking first to institutions,
then to the problem, then back to institutions, and so on until the fit seems
satisfactory.
We will begin, then, with a brief description of certain key features of legal
institutions, which might be relevant to toxics problems. Next, we analyze the
structure of toxics problems in the light of these institutional features. Finally,
we return to institutions, with the nature of toxics problems more clearly in
mind, to propose matches of institutions to particular toxics problems.
A. A TYPOLOGY OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS
Obviously, the various legal techniques and institutions made available by the
prevailing legal culture differ in many ways. Which differences turn out to be
significant? There are no absolute answers, for a variety of differences between
institutions may be important. In general, however, one should pay particular
attention to the differences in the ways that legal institutions process informa-
tion. At base, all legal institutions are simply packages of instructions about how
to process information. Institutions differ in what kinds of information they pro-
cess and in how they process it. Thus, courts use judges and juries to process
information through precedents and testimony, while administrative agencies
such as EPA use more bureaucratic methods and typically consider only written
materials, not oral testimony.
One must next consider what kinds of information processing skills are impor-
tant for a particular policy problem. Toxics problems differ from traditional tort
cases in that they generally involve highly technical issues of toxicology and epi-
demiology. Consequently, one might suspect that differences in the ways various
legal institutions process scientific and technical information might be impor-
tant. Those differences may be summarized as follows:
(1) Whether the legal technique requires a strong causal association as
a condition for action or little or no causal association.
(2) Whether the legal technique operates on broad categories or case-
by-case adjudication.
(3) Whether the applicable legal institutions employ lay or expert deci-
sion makers.
(4) Whether the institution relies on information available in advance
(ex ante) or considers information that became available after the fact
(ex post).
Using these categories, we can construct a typology of various legal techniques
and institutions, as shown in Figure 1.
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FIGURE 1
Causal Decision Category
Institution Technique Association Maker Affected Information
Legislature Tax None Lay Broad Ex Ante
Legislature Statute Weak Lay Broad Ex Ante
Administrative Compensation Moderate Expert Narrow/ Ex Post
Broad44
Administrative Rule Moderate Expert Narrow/ Ex Ante
Broad
Court Civil Strong Lay Narrow Ex Post
Court Criminal Very strong Lay Narrow Ex Ante
Admittedly, actual institutions can be modified in order to deviate from the
ideal types reflected in Figure 1. For example, class actions45 and expert mas-
ters46 in civil litigation may be seen as attempts to ameliorate the effects of case-
by-case adjudication before lay decision makers. Similarly, under certain cir-
cumstances, a legislature may delegate to administrative experts the power to fix
particular tax rates in light of new information, 47 thereby altering somewhat the
lay and ex ante character of regulatory taxes. Such hybrid techniques blur the
distinctions between actual institutions, so that they are not as sharp as may be
suggested by the chart. Nonetheless, I believe that the chart captures the core
tendencies of institutions.
For example, procedural rules allowing court cases to be brought as class ac-
tions48 do broaden the range of parties affected by an adjudication. The central
defining feature remains, however, that courts adjudicate "cases" between identi-
fiable groups of plaintiffs and defendants. This fact has strong implications for
the kind of proof of causal association that courts require. The project of adjudi-
cating a "case" between identifiable plaintiffs and identifiable defendants inher-
ently implies (1) associating the plaintiffs' maladies with the defendants'
conduct, which is distinct from the rest of the world's, and (2) making this asso-
ciation based on evidence that can be made comprehensible to a lay decision
maker.
44. One of the defining features of administrative systems is that they can be designed in a very plastic
way to affect either a narrow category or a broad category. For example, the typical worker's
compensation system deals with a very narrow category, namely, an individual worker. On the other
hand, it is equally possible to design a compensation system like the black lung fund, which affects broad
categories. See Elliott, Why Courts?: Comment on Robinson, 14 J. LEGAL STUD (forthcoming).
45. See Rosenberg, supra note 1, at 908-16 (1984) (discussing class treatment of mass exposure claims).
46. See McGovern, Management of Multiparty Toxic Tort Litigation: Case Law and Trends Affecting
Management, 19 FORUM 1, 14 (1983) (discussing use of magistrates, special masters, experts, and expert
panels).
47. See J.R. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928) (Tariff Act of 1922 authorizing
President to regulate customs duties not invalid delegation of Congress' taxing power because Congress
declared "intelligible principle" and merely gave President and advisory commission authority to execute
it).
48. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
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B. THE TOXICS PROBLEM
The first thing the institutional analyst discovers by attending to the structure
of "the toxics problem" is that there is not one "toxics problem" but many. The
word "toxics" is not a scientific term. It has little precise meaning beyond a
layperson's vague sense of "some nasty stuff in the environment that might kill
us." The substances that lawyers group together under the label "toxics" vary in
a number of different ways, including:
(1) the length of the typical latency period from exposure to the onset
of disease;
(2) the typical exposure route;
(3) the state of scientific knowledge about the causal relationships be-
tween exposure and disease;
(4) whether the disease involved is rare or common;
(5) whether the disease involved has one primary cause or many;
(6) the value of the substance for economic purposes and the availabil-
ity of substitutes;
(7) the availability of remedial therapies and/or control technologies.
Any of these factors can be important for selecting appropriate legal mecha-
nisms and institutions. Their very existence implies that the best match of legal
institutions to one toxics problem.will not necessarily be appropriate for different
substances with different characteristics.
A few examples will illustrate how toxics problems differ in ways that affect
the selection of appropriate legal mechanisms. In some instances, it is easy to
associate particular diseases with exposures to particular substances. This is typi-
cally true when the disease has a relatively short latency period, virtually no
other causes of the symptoms are known, and exposure routes are clear. For
example, if children who live nextdoor to a lead smelter begin to exhibit the
physical symptoms characteristic of acute lead poisoning, it is easy to surmise
what is probably responsible.49 Similarly, even though the latency period is
longer, if workers in asbestos processing plants suffer the symptoms of asbestosis
or mesothelioma-two relatively rare diseases that epidemological studies have
shown to be associated with exposure to airborne asbestos 50-the causal rela-
tionship may be more difficult to infer, but it is still relatively easy for a lay
decision maker to associate particular injuries to particular persons with expo-
sure to a particular substance. 5 1
The characteristics I have been describing (a rare disease, relatively few
known causes, and a clear exposure route) allow us to fit these cases into the
pattern required by civil cases for damages in court. We can satisfy the require-
ment of causal association that a lay decision maker can infer between a particu-
lar plaintiff's injuries and the conduct of particular defendants.
In the abstract, the inference of a causal association between particular inju-
49. Cf R.L. Renken v. Harvey Aluminum, Inc., 226 F. Supp. 169 (D. Or. 1963) (nuisance suit by
owner of adjoining orchard to restrain emissions of fluorine from production of aluminum).
50. S. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICS OF CANCER 80-83 (rev. ed. 1979)
51. See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1090-93 (5th Cir. 1973) (upholding
jury finding that insulation worker's exposure to insulation material that generated asbestos dust was
proximate cause of worker's asbestosis), cert denied, 419 U.S 869 (1974).
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ries and particular conduct can be based on any information available at the time
of the trial, without regard to whether the information existed when the defend-
ant's conduct took place. Indeed, some courts have held that in civil cases,
where only monetary damages are at stake, the necessary inference may be made
ex post, that is, based on information that has only become available since the
exposure occurred. 52 If, however, information about risks of serious bodily
harm had been available at the time the exposures occurred (that is, ex ante), it
would be possible to satisfy the traditional "willfulness" requirement for crimi-
nal, as well as civil, remedies against the defendants. 53
An example from the other end of the spectrum is the sulfur oxides produced
by combustion of fossil fuels like coal. Relatively strong epidemiological evi-
dence tells us that chronic exposure to elevated levels of sulfur oxides in the air
increases the risk of several common diseases, including heart attacks and em-
physema.54 It is impossible, however, to associate any particular heart attack
with sulfur oxide pollution, rather than cigarette smoking, lack of exercise, diet,
or a host of other factors that can be shown to contribute to an individual's risk
of dying from a heart attack. Indeed, in a world in which every victim is in fact
exposed to multiple factors that tend to increase risks, the question of which one
"really caused" the event may not be meaningful.
Assuming that we could get past the philosophical issue and could attribute
particular deaths to sulfur oxides pollution in some meaningful sense, the legal
system would still face virtually insurmountable difficultites in holding particular
actors responsible. Tens of thousands of separate sources, some thousands of
miles away, all contribute to the polluted air that an individual breathes during a
lifetime. Even with sophisticated computer modeling techniques, we cannot esti-
mate the relative contributions of individual sources except for a few major
sources located within a radius of about fifty kilometers. 55 But in some in-
stances, a substantial proportion of the sulfur oxides to which an individual is
exposed originate beyond the range within which current technology allows us to
estimate relative contributions.
We cannot expect, however, that improvements in technology will make it
easier to hold particular actors responsible. As a thought experiment, imagine
that suddenly a perfect technology of culpability analysis is invented-an imagi-
nary machine that would somehow magically determine the precise contribution
that each polluter had made to each individual victim's risk of suffering a heart
attack. The practical, administrative problems for the legal system would in-
crease, not decrease. With perfect knowledge would come the realization that
52. E.g., Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982) (defendants in
product liability case based on strict liability for failure to warn may not raise "state of the art" defense).
Imposing liability ex post remains controversial among tort lawyers. This controversy exists in large
part because of the confused mixture of goals that currently engulfs product liability law. See supra text
pt. I.
53. For a discussion of possible logical and empirical justifications for imposing criminal liability on
product manufacturers, see Wheeler, The Use of Criminal Statutes to Regulate Product Safety, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 593 (1984).
54. See generally NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, SULFUR OXIDES 180-209 (1978); see also L.
LAVE & E. SEKiN, AIR POLLUTION AND HUMAN HEALTH 235-44 (1977) (examining causal association
between air pollution and mortality rates).
55. EPA, GUIDELINES ON AIR QUALITY MODELS 10 (1978).
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each person's risk proffle is unique-that a steel mill a thousand miles away in
Gary, Indiana was responsible for the pollution that contributed .00083 percent
of the total risk of Jones's heart attack in Hartford, Connecticut, but only .00075
percent of Smith's, who lives down the street where a hill creates an eddy in the
prevailing winds that bring in sulfur oxide pollution from out of state.
Sometimes we would get lucky: there would be a single, identifiable cause
which by itself accounts for fifty percent-or maybe even only fifteen to twenty
percent-of the risk. If so, we could declare the one source or group of sources
that "sticks out like a sore thumb" to be the "proximate" cause, and forget about
all the rest, even though collectively they might account for eighty percent. But
suppose that there is no single source or group of sources that "sticks out like a
sore thumb." Suppose instead that there are many contributing causes and that
the contribution by each of them is very small? The administrative costs of
working with individual culpability analysis profiles for each case of illness
would simply be too great.56 At some point-probably long before we got to
Smith and Jones-we would either have to deny liability altogether, or begin to
work with larger categories and to ignore the differences among the individual
sources within the categories. One could, for example, impose a tax based on the
sulfur content of fuels, overlooking the effects of distance, terrain, and a host of
other features in apportioning costs. The reason for doing so is not that the
actual effect of the other features is unknowable-remember, by hypothesis we
have a magical machine that would tell us-but that the costs of administering
the system would simply be too great for it to be worthwhile to assess ten thou-
sand sources pro rata for their unique, individual contributions to the risk of
Smith's heart attack. The game of individualized adjudication to associate par-
ticular injuries with the conduct of particular defendants simply would not be
worth the candle.
Which factual distinctions to bother making, and which to ignore (that is, how
broadly to form the applicable legal categories) varies with the circumstances.
How broadly or narrowly to cast the legal categories applied to a particular
problem is a function of what information is available, administrative costs, and
the value of making the distinctions. These are obviously matters of degree, but
where thousands of small sources contribute to a problem, regulation plus com-
pensation funds fed by taxes are probably the legal mechanism of choice.
Somewhere between the two poles represented by acute lead poisoning on one
hand and sulfur oxide pollution on the other are substances that have been
shown statistically to increase the incidence of cancer. Often the only evidence
available is the results of tests in animals, and therefore the scientific uncertain-
ties are relatively large. Even in the best possible circumstances, however, when
plenty of good epidemiological data is available for human populations, it will be
very difficult to associate particular maladies with particular exposures to partic-
ular toxic substances.
By definition, epidemiology speaks to the incidence of disease in groups, not
individual cases.5 7 Whether one is willing to draw inferences from epidemiologi-
56. Cf Robinson, supra note 1.
57. See generally S. EnSTEiN, supra note 50, at 38-46 (discussing techniques of epidemiological re-
search); see also Landes & Posner, Tort Law as a Regulatory Regime for Catastrophic Personal Injuries, 13
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cal evidence to individual cases depends not only on the amount and quality of
the epidemiological data available, but also on the rarity of the disease involved,
the number of other potential causes, and the confidence level required (that is,
how important one considers an error in one direction as opposed to an error in
the other).
For relatively rare cancers, such as angiosarcoma of the liver among workers
in vinyl chloride plants,58 it is possible to draw causal inferences with enough
confidence to permit administrative agencies to support regulatory standards;5 9
it would be more difficult to use the same evidence to draw the necessary infer-
ences in wrongful death suits against the employer; 60 and criminal prosecutions
would be out of the question (even if other requirements such as "willfulness"
could be met).
Other carcinogens present even more difficult problems of associating individ-
ual victim's illnesses with the actions of individual defendants. Suppose that
exposure to a particular substance contributes to the risk of a common cancer,
but that the respective contributions by it and all other causes are all very small.
An example might be low levels of ionizing radiation and leukemia.61 Virtually
every leukemia victim has been exposed to small amounts of radiation that in-
crease the statistical risk of contracting the disease by a very small amount.
Nonetheless, it is very difficult for a leukemia victim to demonstrate a causal
connection sufficient to recover in a tort suit based on exposure to radiation.62
The problem is not simply "scientific uncertainty." Rather it is the sheer
number of small contributors to the total risk, which makes it impractical to
match particular exposures to the disease suffered by particular victims.
C. MAKING MATCHES
Legal institutions differ in a large number of ways that might be important for
making matches between legal institutions and particular problems. For exam-
ple, economist Steven Shavell has proposed four factors, which can be assimi-
lated under the general rubric of "transaction costs," and which he maintains
underlie the social decision for administrative regulations as opposed to tort lia-
bility.63 Even if one assumes, however, that Shavell has described the relevant
J. LEGAL STuD. 417, 423 (1984) ("[U]ncertainty over causation exists at the individual but not aggregate
level."). But cf Black & Lilienfeld, supra note 1 (proposing statistical tests to determine whether epidemi-
ological evidence satisfies traditional tort law standard of proof).
58. See S. EPsrEIN, supra note 50, at 102-17 (case study on vinyl chloride as carcinogen).
59. See Society of Plastic Indus. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.) (upholding OSHA standard for
vinyl chloride), cerL denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975).
60. See Black & Lilienfeld, supra note 1, at 777 ("A clear distinction currently exists between the
standard of proof used in regulation and the standard used in determining tort liability."); Ethyl Corp. v.
EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 13-20 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc) (precautionary standard of evidence sufficient to support
administrative regulation), cert denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976).
61. See generally NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENcEs, THE BIOLOGICAL EFFETS OF IONIZING RADI-
ATION (1980).
62. But cf Prescott v. United States, 523 F. Supp. 918, 923 (D. Nev. 1981) (discussing Nevada work-
ers' compensation statute that creates conclusive presumption that cancers occurring within specified
number of years after employment were caused by exposure to radiation during employment), affd, 731
F.2d 1388 (9th Cir. 1984).
63. Shavell, Liabilityfor Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 357 (1984). Shavell's
four factors are: (1) "difference in knowledge about risky activities"; (2) "private parties might be incapa-
[Vol. 73:13571372
GOAL & INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSES
factors correctly, at present his schema is of relatively little use to the would-be
reformer.
There is very little good empirical data that would permit the would-be re-
former to compare the costs of different legal institutions in the categories
Shavel identifies. We do know that the administrative costs of case-by-case liti-
gation through the tort system are extremely high-exceeding sixty percent of
total costs in one study of asbestos cases (primarily for attorney's fees).64 Propo-
nents of alternatives to the tort system have seized on figures showing that the
costs of case-by-case litigation are extremely high, in order to assert that litiga-
tion is inefficient and therefore that "the full social loss. . could be lowered by
turning to some other method of controlling accident costs and compensating
victims."'65 Unfortunately, the argument is not so easily won. In the first place,
no persuasive data is yet available demonstrating conclusively that the adminis-
trative costs of alternatives to the tort system are substantially lower. (To be
sure, most of us have a strong intuition one way or the other; the point is, how-
ever, that the intuitions go both ways.) Moreover, even if it could be proved that
the adminstrative costs of litigation are higher, their proponents would still ar-
gue that other features of courts (for example, private initiation and control of
proceedings) are "worth" the extra administrative costs.
In the absence of comprehensive comparative cost data, the institutional ana-
lyst must turn elsewhere for a principle to inform the matching of legal institu-
tions to toxics problems. Toxics problems differ in a number of ways, but the one
that is of most importance for matching them to legal institutions and techniques
is informational. At base, all legal institutions are information processing sys-
tems.66 They differ in the methods they use to process information, and there-
fore, in their costs and the kinds of information to which they are differentially
sensitive.
It is helpful to think of the available legal techniques for regulating toxics and
for compensating victims as arrayed along a spectrum. The spectrum ranges
from taxes imposed by legislatures through criminal penalties in courts. At an
intermediate position are administrative regulations and compensation systems.
The character and specificity of the causal information required as a condition
for legal action is what defines the spectrum.
The legal technique that least demands information associating particular in-
juries with the conduct of particular persons is a tax. The legislature may tax an
activity without any showing whatsoever that the activity causes the harm on
which the funds raised will be spent.67 The next technique along the spectrum is
direct legislation. If, for example, Congress passes a statute requiring employers
ble of paying for the full magnitude of harm done"; (3) "parties would not face the threat of suit for harm
done"; and (4) "administrative costs incurred by private parties and by the public."
64. J. KAKALIK, P. EBENER, W. FELSTnNER & M. SHANLEY, CoSTS OF ASBEsros LTGA'nON vii,
table S.2 (Rand Inst. for Civil Justice 1983) (victims receive only 37% of total costs paid by defendants
and insurers).
65. Oi, Tort Law as a Regulatory Regime" A Comment on Landes and Posner, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 435,
439 (1984).
66. See generally Elliott, Holmes and Evolution: Legal Process as Artificial Intelligence, 13 J. LEGAL
STUD. 113 (1984).
67. See New York Rapid Transit Corp. v. City of New York, 303 U.S. 573, 584-87 (1938) (Constitution
does not require any special relationship between class taxed and purposes for which proceeds spent).
1985] 1373
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
to compensate employees for certain injuries, several different clauses of the Con-
stitution converge to require a minimal showing of some at least vaguely plausi-
ble relationship between the legislation and a legitimate governmental purpose.68
In practice, however, this is not a very demanding standard, since the courts are
extremely tolerant of the legislature's discretion to define both the category of
beneficiaries 69 and the class charged with the costs. 70
The evidentiary requirements for administrative action are more demanding
than those for legislation, but less demanding than those for case-by-case litiga-
tion in court. The standards of proof required under various statutes differ, but
as a general matter, administrative action must be supported by some evidence
on the record. 71 There is no requirement, however, that the evidence supporting
the agency's position be stronger than the evidence against it, only that the
agency's interpretion of the evidence be "reasonable. ' 72 Moreover, a reviewing
court is required to defer to the agency's putative expertise in evaluating scien-
tific and technical evidence, and administrative rules designed to protect health
and safety may be set on a "precautionary" basis based on evidence that would
not "stand up in court" in a civil suit.73 Finally, administrative regulations gen-
erally address classes of activities, rather than matching particular injuries to
particular actions. Thus, for example, a regulation may affect an entire industry,
or even more broadly, all users of a substance such as benzene, on the theory
that workers as a group will be safer (statistical lives will be saved), even though
it is impossible to identify any particular person who has been, or will be injured,
by exposure to the substance.
Case-by-case litigation in courts is at the most demanding end of the spec-
trum. Of all the legal techniques available for regulating and compensating vic-
tims of toxic substance poisoning, litigation in the courts requires the most
information to establish a causal association between injuries to particular plain-
tiffs and conduct of particular defendants. Two central features define litigation
in courts. First, courts as institutions depend on factfinding by lay judges and
juries. Second, courts adjudicate "cases" betweeen identifiable groups of plain-
tiffs and defendants. This implies (even in a class action) that information must
exist that permits a lay decision maker to match one group's injuries to another
group's actions. But such information does not always exist, and in such in-
stances, the tort system "leaves the loss where it falls."
The differences among legal techniques in the nature of the causal information
68. See generally Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLuM. L. REv. 1689 (1984)
(discussing means-ends test under dormant commerce, privileges and immunities, equal protection, due
process, contract, and eminent domain clauses).
69. See United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 176-79 (1980) (upholding
withdrawal of retirement benefits from certain employees).
70. See Usery v. Turner Elldorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15-20 (1976) (upholding imposition of liabil-
ity on mining companies for pneumoconiosis of former employees and su*staining "irrebuttable presump-
tion" that death was due to pneumoconiosis based on specified clinical evidence).
71. See generally Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982).
72. Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm., 383 U.S. 607, 618-20 (1966); B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRA-
TIVE LAW §§ 10.8-.9 (1984).
73. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 33-37 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976); see
also American Textile Mfrs. Ass'n v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 522-36 (1981) (upholding OSHA adoption
of Cotton Dust Standard after agency determined on basis of economic and technical data that standard
was "economically feasible").
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they demand can provide a consistent basis for matching legal techniques to
toxics problems. Where little or no information exists that will permit injuries to
be associated with particular activities, broadly based taxes can nonetheless be
used to spread losses. As more information develops, and there is some reason
to believe that particular activities cause more than their fair share of illness and
disease, they might be subjected to correspondingly higher taxes, set either by
the legislature or, more likely, in administrative proceedings. Adjusting the
amounts that a particular activity is charged makes sense only when there is
enough information to allow us to estimate the relative contribution to the total
harm attributable to that class of activity. As better and better information de-
velops, it may become possible to match particular injuries to the actions of indi-
vidual defendants or groups of defendants. If, but only if, that type of
information exists, it may be advantageous to use case-by-case litigation as the
method of allocating charges to particular defendants. If the available informa-
tion makes it possible to associate particular harms with the conduct of identifi-
able groups of defendants, it does not follow that it will necessarily be
worthwhile to do so. That will depend on whether the benefits, either moral or
economic, of particularizing the charges outweigh the costs of the process. How-
ever, in the absence of information permitting the association of particular ill-
nesses to the actions of particular groups of defendants, litigation is mismatched
to the structure of toxics problems.
We can imagine a legal system in which a central, coordinating authority
would constantly review the available information base for thousands of toxic
and potentially toxic substances and issue edicts-subject to judicial review, of
course-about which legal technique is most appropriate. Such a system would
be cumbersome and inefficient. A better way to coordinate the application of
various legal techniques is through a system of rules internal to each of the tech-
niques themselves. These rules would define the domain or jurisdiction of each
technique in relation to the others.
The key principle that should underlie the jurisdictional rules is that the appli-
cation of a technique based on more refined and specific information should pre-
empt the applicability of cruder legal mechanisms. For example, when an
administrative body determines that enough information exists to enable it to
establish charges proportional to the harm caused by an activity, its action
should preempt the broadly based taxes imposed in its absence. (Alternatively,
the administrative charges could be superimposed as surcharges or rebates on
top of a constant, broadly based tax.) Similarly, once enough is known to pre-
scribe administrative rules, enforced through criminal penalties, to regulate the
risk from particular substances, that should preempt tort cases, in which juries
are free to strike their own balance between costs and benefits.
The proposals outlined at the beginning of this paper are an attempt to imple-
ment these principles in order to coordinate legal techniques in light of available
information.
IV. CONCLUSION
Perhaps the most provocative and interesting part of Calabresi's For Harry
Kalven is an insight he proposes at the end. Calabresi suggests that what the law
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considers "the cause" of a malady will change as the technology available for
controlling it changes.
[Miany seemingly significant philosophical questions concerning cause
become irrelevant to the use of that term in law. To amplify: so far as
legal language is concerned, the "cause" of a disease would depend on
how, at any given time, it could be most easily controlled. From this
point of view, in the nineteenth century it would have been appropriate
to speak of the "cause" of tuberculosis as the absence of sun and the
presence of bad living conditions. . . . With the identification of the
Koch bacillus all that changed. At first potentially, and subsequently
in practice, efforts directed at this causally linked element seemed most
likely to control the disease. . . . More recently, the prospect of ge-
netic engineering has again changed the causal language appropriate to
this disease. Now one can, in a meaningful way, speak of genetic pre-
disposition as a "cause" of tuberculosis. 74
Calabresi's insight that changes in scientific information may affect which fac-
tors a court considers to be the legal "cause" of a malady is profound. But he
does not carry the insight to its logical conclusion: namely, that changes in sci-
entific information may also affect which technologies of justice are appropriate
to particular problems.
74. Calabresi, supra note 26, at 105-06.
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